

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

STABILIZATION OF AFRICA THROUGH MILITARY POWER

by

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Aho
United States Marine Corps

Dr. Louis J. Nigro, Jr.
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 18 MAR 2005		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Stabilization of Africa Through Military Power				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) John Aho				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 28	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel John A. Aho

TITLE: Stabilization of Africa through Military Power

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 18 March 2005 PAGES: 28 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Despite the billions of dollars of economic aid provided to the many destitute nations of Africa, the continent has made little gains in securing economic prosperity and ending human suffering among its hundreds of millions of inhabitants. Unless long-term stability can be achieved in the numerous failed or failing states within all regions of the continent, the nations of Africa will be unsuccessful in leveraging their considerable natural resources and human capital to achieve their economic potential.

African stability is undoubtedly within our national interests due to our growing reliance on African oil, our need for global partners in prosecuting the global war on terrorism, our pursuit of emerging economic opportunities and our support of humanitarian efforts for the impoverished. In order to successfully break Africa from its reliance on foreign aid, the U.S. must aggressively apply the diplomatic, information, economic and military elements of national power to secure African stability for the long-term. Among these elements, military power offers the most promise in achieving stability in the near-term.

The drawdown of U.S. forces from Europe offers a timely opportunity to maintain a military presence in the region while also fostering African stability. Clearly, the forward-basing of a portion of these forces within the African continent offers many strategic advantages—including an immediate and viable means of contributing to the stabilization of Africa.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to acknowledge the assistance and mentoring provided by the Project Advisor, Dr. Louis Nigro, throughout the course of this assignment. Dr. Nigro's extensive background in African affairs was truly instrumental in providing the author with a strategic perspective on Africa and its emerging importance in respect to our national interests.

STABILIZATION OF AFRICA THROUGH MILITARY POWER

Most Americans associate Africa with hardships and a never-ending flow of economic and humanitarian aid to destitute nations beset by many civil wars, famines, epidemics, and corrupt political leaders that have plagued that continent for so long. It is not surprising then that Americans might find it difficult to readily appreciate the many benefits that an increased U.S. involvement in the continent could provide to our nation. Nevertheless, our increased involvement in the pursuit of African stability will prove beneficial in securing several key national interests such as identifying burgeoning petroleum sources, prosecuting the war on terrorism, capitalizing on emerging economic opportunities and reducing humanitarian/economic aid requirements.

The primary obstacle in securing our African interests is instability. This instability is fueled by various crises within failing African nations such as HIV/AIDS, lack of development and military conflict. At times, these crises appear insurmountable and it will require the application of all elements of our national power—diplomatic, information, military and economic—as well as the efforts of non-government organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs) and our multinational allies in order to overcome them and bring stability to the continent.

As a nation, our generosity in providing both economic and humanitarian aid to Africa has been unmatched; however, without stability on the continent, the billions of U.S. dollars provided annually to Africa will have little affect in attaining our key African interests. History has clearly demonstrated that aid alone is not the answer to the myriad of Africa's problems.

The purpose of this paper is two-fold; to discuss why African stability is clearly in our strategic national interests and to identify innovative means of employing the military element of nation power—specifically, through the permanent forward-basing of U.S. forces—as a means to assist in securing African stability. A stable Africa will in turn be able to maximize its vast economic potential due to its abundant natural resources and labor—a potential that, if realized, also holds considerable promise for American energy, security and economic interests.

FAILING STATES WITHIN A FAILING CONTINENT

Instability in Africa is the result of the negative political and social effects of HIV/AIDS, lack of development and conflict. These complex problems requiring equally complex solutions involving the entire world community. Viable solutions for each will undoubtedly share a common element—a means for establishing regional stability.

HIV/AIDS

To date, AIDS has left at least 11 million African orphans—many of whom are also infected with the disease.¹ Equally troubling is the expected loss of leadership within the continent, both in the public and private sector, due to the spread of the AIDS virus. Many African nations' military strength has been decimated by AIDS, significantly reducing their ability to defend their borders, prevent insurgency and protect their populations. A senior military officer who recently spoke at the Army War College stated that up to 50% of the South African military may be infected with HIV, threatening its ability to defend its people and its borders.² South Africa is not alone in this trend; likewise, many other militaries within Africa may soon become non-effective due this pandemic. In response to this crisis, the U.S. has become a significant participant in the United Nations Secretary General's HIV/AIDS global fund, having pledged \$15 billion over the next five years.³ Regrettably, money alone will not stem the tide of this human tragedy; only stable African governments enacting effective HIV/AIDS prevention programs and providing proper medical treatment for their populations will make headway in this fight.

LACK OF DEVELOPMENT

Memories of frequent African famines remain within our collective memories. Troubled by the many deaths associated with the Ethiopian famines of the 1980's, we became deeply involved in the Somalia crisis of 1991 and deployed military forces to that failed state in order to ensure the flow of donated food and water to its people during that nation's civil war. The loss of 18 Army Rangers in 1993 led to our departure from Somalia and helped to foster a national hesitancy to involve ourselves in future African relief efforts. This hesitancy was clearly evidenced by our slow and limited involvement in support of relief efforts for Rwanda during the slaughter of over 800,000 people in 1994.⁴ Additionally, despite advances in agricultural technology, large scale famines continue in Africa in places such as Sudan and Zimbabwe with no relief expected in the future due to growing populations and continued abundance of unstable African governments that are both unable to feed their people and, often times, too corrupt to care.

CONFLICT

Ongoing Africa conflicts affect approximately 20 percent of the continent's population.⁵ United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations continue in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote D'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo—and elsewhere. Since 1991, U.S. forces have conducted 31 contingency operations in Sub-Saharan Africa.⁶ Failing states and weak

governments continue to be the breeding ground for civil war and terrorist activity. As noted by Sir Ian Forbes, NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, "Future threats come not from conquering states but on failing ones."⁷ Therefore, as we root out terrorists from their hiding places while prosecuting the global war on terrorism, our involvement in African will likely continue for the foreseeable future until stability can be brought to the continent.

STABILITY IN AFRICA IS IN OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS

A stable African continent is in our strategic interests. Our need of establishing regional alliances in order to deny terrorist safe havens post September 11, 2001 and our increased reliance on imported African oil have refocused U.S. interests within Africa as events within the continent are now capable of directly affecting our own defense and economy. Specifically, global terrorist groups like Al Qaeda are suspected of operating freely within numerous African nations, while the continent now provides approximately 18 percent of our imported oil.⁸

As evidence of Africa's ever-emerging prominence in our strategic interests, numerous references to the continent are clearly and repeatedly delineated throughout the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), the 2004 National Defense Strategy (NDS), the 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS), the 2004-2009 Department of State/US AID Strategic Plan (DoS/USAID StratPlan) and the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT). Our current U.S. African policy directly correlates to six of the nine main objectives listed within the NSS. These six objectives include *championing aspirations for human dignity, strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism, diffusing regional conflicts, preventing threats of weapons of mass destruction, igniting global economic growth, and building the infrastructures of democracy*.⁹ Within our African policy, the Bush Administration utilizes three pillars—a strategic approach, clear policy priorities and principles of bilateral engagement—in the pursuit of these objectives.¹⁰

Upon completing a review of our national security documents and the directed and implied objectives therein, one can logically and succinctly summarize U.S. policy for Africa as follows: Through the use of "regional anchor nations," our allies, international organizations and regional bodies, the U.S. will champion humanitarian, economic, democratic and security initiatives for the people of Africa. Simultaneously, the U.S. will strengthen its energy security and seek economic opportunities by working with African energy producers and trading partners. Economic aid will be provided on a results-based process to those nations pursuing economic, democratic and humanitarian reforms. Finally, the U.S. is committed to ending the spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic that is devastating the African continent.

Our national interests in Africa are most appropriately categorized as “important” as opposed to “vital” or “peripheral,” as unfulfilled issues involving global terrorism originating from Africa and African oil will eventually affect core national interests—specifically, U.S. physical security and economic prosperity. It may be argued, however, that as our dependence on African oil increases as anticipated over the coming years, our national interests in Africa should commensurately increase to “vital.” From a humanitarian perspective, our failure to respond to a future crisis involving African genocide or famine may eventually affect our core national interest of promotion of values. Specific areas of concern that now place Africa squarely within our strategic interests include petroleum, counterterrorism, economic opportunities and humanitarian need.

PETROLEUM

The U.S. currently imports approximately half its needed petroleum; many of our western trading partners are even more dependent on imported oil.¹¹ As we are so closely linked within the current globalized world markets, a threat to any developed nation’s petroleum needs ultimately affects our economy and those of all other developed nations. The continued development of African oil resources will help to diversify sources of our foreign oil imports, reducing the effect of a single region’s crisis upon our energy demands. Due to its considerable reserves of light sweet crude oil—oil that is most suitable for our energy needs—Nigeria is currently the fifth largest supplier of crude oil to the US.¹² Additionally, Nigeria has the potential to increase its crude oil production significantly in the coming years as recent deep water discoveries come on stream.¹³ It is estimated that Nigeria also possesses the ninth largest natural gas reserves.¹⁴ Other African nations with considerable oil reserves include Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Chad and Cameroon.

COUNTERTERRORISM

Within the NMS, objectives directly and indirectly pertaining to Africa are “protect the United States, and prevent conflict and surprise attack and prevail against adversaries.” In the global war on terrorism, it is understood that the military must bear the largest share among the elements of national power in this regard. The ultimate objective in this endeavor is to reduce scope and reduce capability of terrorists, ultimately returning terrorism to the criminal domain.¹⁵ Many failing states within Africa are breeding grounds for global terrorist organizations that are often free to operate across porous borders as these states possess no means to effectively control their territory or maintain a situational awareness of the activities occurring within them. Clearly, effective immigration programs and controlled national borders would have a

considerable effect in the identification and tracking of the nearly 140 million people who live outside of their country of origin, and the millions of people who cross international borders every day.¹⁶ Additionally, the NMS's priorities of "countering threats close to their source, creating a global anti-terrorism environment, and ensuring forward posture and presence" have clear and direct applicability for our military's counter terrorism efforts in Africa.

The NMS holds that "We will route out terrorists from their safe havens." North Africa is within the arc of instability as noted within the NSS, as clearly evidence by the death of over 100,000 Algerians in that country at the hands of domestic terrorists since 1993, and the deaths of 44 people in terrorist bombings within Casablanca in May 2003.¹⁷ Al Qaeda elements and sympathizers are also active in the Sub-Saharan countries of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Cote D'Ivoire and Mauritania.¹⁸ Both North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa include many nations whose porous borders and inadequate (or unwilling) military forces are unable to root out terrorists and their training camps. As noted by a recent speaker at the Army War College, it is anticipated that following Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), numerous transnational terrorists currently fighting in Iraq will return to their countries of origin in Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus.¹⁹ In the defense of our nation from terrorism, it is clearly within our national interests to eliminate terrorist and their training camps within the African continent today, and to deny terrorist use of African nations as safe havens in the future.

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES

As noted within the NSS, a strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing prosperity and freedom throughout the rest of the world—to include the continent of Africa. After U.S.-Sub-Saharan Africa trade declined from 27.8 billion (2001) to 24.1 billion (2002),²⁰ the Bush administration sought to enhance economic relations between Africa and the U.S. through new trade policies. It is significant to note that the U.S. is currently the largest single country importer of African goods—comprised predominantly of petroleum and apparel.²¹ A significant economic objective within our Africa policy is to tie aid to results-based progress in political and economic reform—through programs like the \$5 billion Millennium Challenge Initiative account. The administration intends to meet its economic objective of enhancing economic relations between Africa and the US through the utilization of trade agreements such as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), renewed in July 2004. U.S. participation in this act has resulted in an increase of African exports to the US by 55%, while American businesses saw a 15% increase in our exports to Sub-Saharan Africa, equaling almost \$7 billion.²² The U.S. will also seek to leverage the World Bank and other development banks to

increase global investment in Africa. Unless stability is brought to the continent, enabling foreign investment, it is expected that numerous African nations will maintain their dependence on international economic and humanitarian aid for the foreseeable future.

HUMANITARIAN NEED

Despite our frequent involvement in African crisis, our nation has been historically slow to initiate response to humanitarian crises within the continent. U.S. response to humanitarian crises are clearly acceptable and suitable, based on their support by a compassionate American public. However, since our Somalia experience, the feasibility of a U.S. response within Africa is often in question. As previously noted, the failure to respond to such crises in the future may have considerable impact on our own security and economic well-being back home when regional issues deteriorate into global crises. Specifically, the U.S. has yet to take any direct action to stop what former Secretary of State Colin Powell had deemed as bona fide genocide occurring in Darfur at the hands of Arab rebels supporting the Sudanese government.²³ It has been reported that over 30,000 Sudanese have been killed in a campaign of ethnic cleansing.²⁴ This crisis has been ongoing since fighting resumed in 2003; both the U.S. and the UN issued public condemnation of the Sudanese government for the violence committed against civilians in the fall of 2003. Although it has been noted that U.S. policy seeks to leverage regional organizations to solve crisis—the African Union has deployed a mere 300 observers to Darfur in August 2004²⁵—acts of genocide should not be allowed to continue over such an extended period without a strong U.S. response if regional organizations cannot deliver the goods. In such cases, the U.S. should consider acting unilaterally.

AID ALONE DOESN'T WORK

Aside from meeting basic needs of food, shelter and clothing, billions of U.S. dollars provided in the form of economic aid over the last several decades have accomplished little in enabling Africa achieve economic prosperity. To foster and sustain development, economic aid requires a stable environment. Despite the considerable flow of economic aid from the U.S. to Africa, little development will be achieved until stability is established on the continent.

U.S. FOREIGN AID POLICY

The U.S. remains the largest international economic aid donor in terms of U.S. dollars, though some critics have argued that the U.S. is actually sixteenth on the list of donor nations when aid is calculated against our Gross Domestic Product (GDP).²⁶ Regardless of its numerical standing, the U.S. contributed over \$20 billion dollars in foreign assistance to 150

nations of the world (not including Iraqi) during fiscal year 2004.²⁷ Of that total, Africa received 18.5 percent (or approximately \$4.4 billion)²⁸, with six African nations among the top 16 receiving American aid.²⁹ This aid provided by the U.S.—the largest bilateral aid provider to Africa—is more than triple the amount provided in 2001.³⁰ It is appropriate to note that these numbers reflect only direct bilateral and multilateral U.S. government aid and do not include costs of military operations in response to African crises or aid provided through the private sector.

A United States Agency for International Development (USAID) White Paper defines the goals of American foreign aid as:

- Promoting transformational development, especially in the areas of governance, institutional capacity and economic restructuring
- Strengthening fragile states
- Providing humanitarian assistance
- Supporting U.S. geo-strategic interests, particularly in countries such as Iraq, Pakistan, Jordan, Egypt and Israel
- Mitigating global and international ills, including HIV/AIDS

It is clear that five of these six goals apply to Africa. The majority of U.S. aid is provided bilaterally by the Treasury Department to a specific nation; however, significant aid is also provided multilaterally by USAID to nations via international organizations such as the World Bank.

WORLD BANK PROBLEMS

The use of intermediaries in providing aid to Africa presents risk that money donated by the U.S. may not reach its intended target. The U.S. has little oversight over the spending of aid provided multilaterally to international organizations; specifically the \$18.5 billion the World Bank provided in 2003 to post-conflict nations. As the U.S. has no veto power regarding World Bank aid, a considerable amount of the nearly \$3 billion provided by the U.S. to the World Bank in 2003 may have been granted to nations counter to U.S. desires and policy.³¹ As previously noted, the Bush administration seeks to provide aid to those nations meeting established criteria in humanitarian, governmental and economic practices. However, without U.S. oversight in the World Bank, it is unknown whether such criteria have been met by the aid recipient. Based on our history as a charitable nation, it is clear that the U.S. will continue to lead the world in the provision of foreign aid—though we may be best served by providing all of our aid through

bilateral means until organizations like the World Bank provide better accountability to donor nations regarding distribution of aid.

MILITARY POWER AS A STABILIZING FORCE

Though beneficial in humanitarian sense, the billions of dollars provided to the nations of Africa has had little effect on the economic development of the continent. Although the Bush administration has implemented an effects-based aid policy through which nations must display improvements in good governance practices and human rights in order to receive U.S. aid, it is clear that aid must be accompanied by stability in order to have a positive and lasting effect. Recently, there have been countless recommendations published on application of the military element of national power as a means to provide African stability. These recommendations range from the use of U.S. forces as trainers of African militaries in counter-terrorism and border control operations to the establishment of a new combatant command—U.S. Africa Command. Often included within these various recommendations is a common theme, the establishment of small contingency bases and airfields—or “lily pads”—for use during contingencies or training exercises only. Though such recommendations are a step in the right direction in stabilizing a region whose strategic significance is expected to grow exponentially in the coming years, a bolder and more decisive step to ending the perpetual drain of failing Africa nations on the developing nations of the world must be taken; specifically, the establishment of expeditionary bases as proposed in U.S. European Command’s (EUCOM) Strategic Theater Transformation Plan, to be located on the continent of Africa. This recommendation is a hybrid of U.S. European Command’s proposed models of Joint Main Operating Base (JMOB) and Joint Forward Operating Site (JFOS) to be used throughout the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR), as these bases should remain expeditionary in nature (JMOBs are hardened and permanent) and perpetually manned by a sizeable presence (JFOSs maintain limited U.S. military support presence except during contingencies).³²

A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent drawdown of our Europe-based forces offer a timely opportunity in the provision of African stability. Despite this drawdown, thousands of U.S. forces remain forward deployed in Germany—one of the most expensive countries in which to reside in Europe. Considerable forces are also based within other high-cost European countries such as Italy, Spain and England. Alongside many of these troops are military dependents, necessitating the payment of considerable cost of living and housing allowances and the maintenance of costly installations to support these units and related base activities. As

evidenced during the workup to Operation Iraqi Freedom, political agreement between the U.S. and these European countries—specifically Germany and Spain—cannot always be assumed at the outset of conflict or maintained through conflict resolution. Such political disagreement threatens our ability to deploy quickly from countries such as Germany due to our reliance on host nation facilities such as airbases and ports. Finally, troops based within Europe face considerable environmental and live-fire training constraints. Additionally, the post 9/11 military operations tempo has resulted in a “return the troops to CONUS installations” mindset in order to reunite service members with their loved ones, offer family stability, maintain required reenlistment rates, and spend base support dollars in CONUS where American businesses can benefit. It is apparent that the forward-basing of large substantial forces still remaining in Europe no longer serves the purpose for that which it was intended—the defense of Europe. Instead, it has become a pricey means for projecting forces in austere regions like Africa and the Middle East.

To best conduct a low-cost, forward basing of troops within the vicinity of EUCOM and CENTCOM AORs, expeditionary bases within Africa should be established to replace many of our Western Europe facilities. Select units currently based in Europe should be reassigned in their entirety to CONUS; elements from these units would then deploy for a six month rotation to these expeditionary bases as a brigade-sized unit—in order to afford bona fide deterrence or “punch” as appropriate. This brigade would be designated as a standing Joint Task Force (JTF) OPCON to the Commander, EUCOM. Forces provided to these JTFs would be trained by the parent command in accordance with a pre-established mission essential task list (METLs).

PRECEDENCE

The establishment of a model expeditionary base and rotational cycle of U.S. forces will require no development as, ironically, an example of such a forward basing of troops within Africa to afford regional stability to serve as a template currently exists—Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. This task force and its expeditionary facility serves as a small scale model of an expeditionary base that, in a larger scale, can bring stability to a select region within Africa; several such task forces could offer a considerable stabilizing ability to the entire continent. Since its inception in 2002, Camp Lemonier has been manned through a rotational basis, providing a constant force of forces for rooting out terrorists while simultaneously training regional militaries.³³ Long term rotational manning of this task force or others like it can be accomplished as evidenced by III Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa, Japan, which has relied for decades on a similar rotation of troops through its own unit deployment program

(UDP) to satisfy its manning requirements. Under this program, CONUS-based units are deployed for 6 months to Okinawa to round out the ground (division) and air (wing) combat elements of the MEF. During this 6-month period, these units conduct applicable unit training to enable them to conduct missions required as members of III MEF. Marines within these units are billeted within unit barracks and remain an unaccompanied status, thus eliminating the requirements for dependent COLA and other related allowances.

ADVANTAGES OF FORWARD-BASING U.S. FORCES IN AFRICA

The advantages of forward-basing U.S. forces in Africa are many. First, Africa affords a strategic location to base troops within the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR) and is within relatively close geographic proximity to other “trouble spots” within the CENTCOM and PACOM AORs such as the Middle East, Central Asia and Southwest Asia. Second, Africa offers a logical, low-cost alternative to Europe in forward deploying forces to conduct crisis response. Troops can benefit from vast training facilities and will be subjected to considerably less environmental regulations and related restrictions. Much of the allowances and travel costs paid to support European-based forces and their dependents can be eliminated by rotating forces in an unaccompanied status into the AOR, while affording stability for service members’ families who would remain in CONUS. Lastly, but perhaps most importantly, forward-basing U.S. troops within Africa would provide a stabilizing effect upon failing African states by deterring civil war and other related armed conflict, prevention/elimination of terrorist-established safe havens within host nations or their neighbors, and protection of U.S. energy interests as Africa will provide 25 percent of our imported oil by 2010.³⁴

Of these advantages, two are indisputable—Africa’s comparable strategic location is clearly apparent and reduced installation support costs are surely logical in a region possessing the world’s lowest cost of living. However, many U.S. leaders may not be in favor of permanently basing U.S. forces within the continent out of fear that such basing would all but assure our continual and deep involvement in the continent’s many conflicts. Though a reasonable fear, our presence on the continent would deter many of the conflicts in question. One only has to look at the response of both rebel and government forces fighting within Liberia following the deployment of an Amphibious Ready Group, to include a Marine Expeditionary Unit, off the coast of that nation’s capital of Monrovia in July 2003. Immediately upon the arrival of U.S. forces, fighting between government forces loyal to then President Charles Taylor and those of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) rebel groups declined significantly, enabling locals to return to

their homes and places of work. The effects from the presence of these naval forces—though few Marines actually came ashore—were immediate and favorable. Though the memories of Somalia linger within our collective consciences, it is important to remember the early successes of U.S. military forces in that crisis. Upon the initial arrival of Marine forces in 1992, stability was provided to the regional and humanitarian efforts were successfully conducted. Only upon the now famous “mission creep” experienced by Army and United Nations’ forces when combat operations were initiated against select Somali warlords such as General Mohamed Aidid did U.S. forces become ineffective and unwelcome. The argument of whether our military presence in Africa would draw us in to regional conflict is a pointless one as history reminds us of our frequent involvement in copious African crises since 1991. With the increased importance Africa has upon our national security as previously articulated—specifically pertaining to terrorism and energy security—our involvement in future crisis is all but assure. If this is in fact the case, wouldn't we be better prepared to prevent future crises by forward-basing U.S. forces?

U.S. forces forward-based in Africa can also assume the myriad of training programs currently underway between U.S. and African militaries in areas such as counter-terrorism operations and peace keeping. Military training operations were recently conducted between U.S. forces and those of African nations within the African Sahel region—a significant part of the “arc of instability” delineated within the NMS. The \$7 million Pan-Sahel Initiative, co-sponsored by the U.S. State Department and U.S. European Command, was established to facilitate military to military cooperation in the training of host nation military forces in Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania in detecting and responding to suspicious movement of people and goods across and within their borders through training, equipment and cooperation.³⁵ This initiative has subsequently evolved into the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), though its funding for future years is in question.³⁶ Additionally, the Africa Crises Response Initiative (ACRI), a program through which U.S. Special Forces provided training in Chapter VI peacekeeping missions to select West African militaries has likewise evolved into the congressionally favored Africa Contingency Operations and Training Initiative (ACOTA), which utilizes contractors vice Special Forces personnel.³⁷ Finally, CJTF-HOA, located in Djibouti continues in it third year of seeking out terrorists and their safe havens, and training local military forces in eliminating terrorist and controlling their porous borders.

Forward-basing of U.S. forces in Africa will also facilitate the establishment and maintenance of regional rapid response forces to respond to regional crisis within the continent through combined training exercises. We will rely on “anchor nations” and regional

organizations such as the African Union to resolve regional crisis. The viability of the individual nations' and the African Union's rapid response forces is essential to this strategy. Although Nigerian forces, as a part of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peace keeping forces have performed satisfactorily in various West African crises, forces under our other cornerstone states, such as Ethiopia, and forces under the African Union have yet to equate themselves as robust and reliable—specifically, 300 African Union observers in Darfur have not had a stabilizing effect within that conflict.

Finally, ancillary benefits of forward basing U.S. forces in Africa would include mentorship of African militaries that would be exposed to a professional military model in which to emulate, which would enable them to better serve their people, while also exposing them to our democratic values. Undoubtedly, our military presence within Europe will be required for the foreseeable future, and by no means is the recommendation to forward-base U.S. forces within Africa designed to “empty” Europe of our forces. However, as forces do migrate from Europe to the United States over the coming years, the benefits of forward-basing a percentage of these forces within Africa in support of our strategic interests should be considered.

CONCLUSION

The stability of Africa is clearly within our strategic interests. Without this stability, current programs supporting African economic development and good governance will have little chance for success. As a result of the frequent crises associated with the continent, our Africa policy has become clearly prevalent within our many government agencies' security strategies and plans. Our efforts in seeking out and destroying global terrorist networks, need for friendly nations to provide for our energy requirements, search for emerging investment opportunities and support of humanitarian missions will necessitate our considerable involvement within Africa throughout the foreseeable future—regardless of a national desire to do so or not. The end of the cold war and the corresponding relief of the requirement to garrison troops within European nations have resulted in a cost effective opportunity to maintain U.S. forces within the region while also stabilizing a continent whose vast natural resources and labor potential have yet to be tapped—all by forward-basing U.S. forces in Africa. Though the many benefits associated with forward-basing of troops in Africa will have a considerable effect in stabilizing that continent, and ultimately, in securing our strategic interests, it is not the intent of this paper to imply that the U.S. military can achieve this stability alone. Logically, the considerable application of military power will require all government agencies representing the elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military and economic—and the efforts of non-

government organizations (NGOs), international organizations and our multinational partners to be fully employed and closely integrated to ensure a successful end state for African stability. Once achieved, African stability will foster substantial investment in a continent possessing considerable natural resources and an untapped labor force. Such investment will secure vastly improved standards of living for the African peoples and a sizeable return to those nations and organizations shrewd enough to foresee Africa's economic potential—thus ending the incessant need for aid by the continent.

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ENDNOTES

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² The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by a guest speaker at the Army War College.

³ Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, *Fighting AIDS in Africa: A Progress Report; Testimony of Randall L. Tobias, U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator*. 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 7 April 2004, 1.

⁴ Mike Denning, "A Prayer for Marie: Creating an Effective African Standby Force," *Parameters*, Winter 2004-2005, 102.

⁵ Greg Mills, "Africa's New Strategic Significance," *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2004, 158.

⁶ Denning, 103.

⁷ Mills, 159.

⁸ Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion, *Role of West Africa in our Energy Security; Testimony of Paul Simons, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy, Sanctions and Commodity*, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 15 Jul 2004, 2.

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¹³ Ibid, 2.

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¹⁶ Ibid, 13.

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¹⁸ Denning, 104.

¹⁹ The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by a guest speaker at the Army War College.

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²¹ Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion, *AGOA III: The United States/Africa Partnership Act of 2003; Testimony of Alan P. Larson, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs*, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 25 March 2004, 3.

²² The White House, "President Bush Signs African Growth and Opportunity Act," 13 Jul 2004; available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/print/20040713-3.html>>; Internet; accessed 22 September 2004.

²³ Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Crisis in Darfur; Testimony of Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State*. 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 9 September 2004, 4.

²⁴ Cable News Network (CNN), "WHO Seeks Urgent Action to Avert Sudan Crisis," 2 June 2004; available from <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/Africa/06/02/sudan.who/>; Internet; accessed 5 October 2004,

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²⁹ Curt Tarnoff and Larry Nowels, 16.

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